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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades, Mexico has hit the news headlines due to the high levels of 
violence, brutality and drug trafficking. Moreover, the links between political power, 
intelligence agencies, corruption and organised crime have been undeniable in the 
development of narcotrafficking and violence in Mexico. In this scenario, the following 
questions are emerging and are intended to be analyzed throughout this text: Why 
have drug traffickers managed to destabilize the Mexican government? How much 
responsibilities have the U.S. and Mexican intelligence agencies in the development of 
drug trafficking and violence? Can Mexico by itself control the development of drug 
trafficking? Is it possible to establish the rule of law and accountability mechanisms? 
Does the new government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador represent hope for the 
control of violence in Mexico?
KEYWORDS: corruption, drug trafficking, political elites, Mexico, democracy.
RESUMEN 
En las últimas décadas, México ha encabezado los titulares en la prensa debido 
a  los altos niveles de violencia, brutalidad y  tráfico de drogas. Además, pocas veces 
se cuestionan los vínculos entre poder político, agencias de inteligencia, corrupción 
y crimen organizado en el desarrollo del narcotráfico y violencia en México. En este 
escenario, emergen las siguientes preguntas, las cuales se intentan analizar a lo largo del 
texto: ¿Por qué los narcotraficantes han logrado desestabilizar al gobierno mexicano? 
¿Cuánta responsabilidad tienen las agencias de inteligencia de los Estados Unidos 
y México en el desarrollo del narcotráfico y la violencia? ¿Puede México controlar por 
sí mismo el desarrollo del tráfico de drogas? ¿Es posible establecer el Estado de derecho 
y los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas? ¿Representa el nuevo gobierno de Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador una esperanza para el control de la violencia en México?
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The development of drug trafficking in Mexico is relatively recent. Before the 
1920’s, marijuana production was mainly used among Mexican people for me-
dicinal and ritualistic purposes, and opium cultivation was almost unknown. 
during the second World War (1939–1945), the United states of america re-
quired huge amounts of morphine and other drugs to help american soldiers 
face the battlefield (astorga 1999).
In Mexico, the use and consumption of drugs “was not a widespread phe-
nomenon and the number of consumers was far less than the figures of its 
northern neighbour” (astorga 1999: 12). at the end of the forties and with 
the end of the second World War, the U.s government launched a very active 
and intensive campaign to convince other countries to accept opium control, 
later on imposing restrictions on marijuana and cocaine, since addiction to 
drugs among american population experienced a  big increase. as the re-
strictions on these products increased, the demand and price rose, creating 
a new market of opportunities for criminal groups. today, Mexico is a major 
source and transit country for heroin, marijuana and synthetic drugs des-
tined for the United states and a main transit country for cocaine from south 
america. according to the International narcotics control strategy report 
2017, in Mexico the illicit drug production rose from 250 metric tons in 2011 
to 600 in 2015 (BInLea 2017: 215). It is estimated that Mexican cartels gen-
erate “a profit of $6.6 billion in gross revenue annually just from exporting 
drugs to the Us alone” (Gutiérrez 2018). simultaneously, “the country has 
had over 200,000 drug-related killings since 2006. Last year alone –2017–, 
29,168 homicides were recorded, reaching the highest homicide rate over the 
last 20 years” (Gutiérrez 2018). 
In this scenario, the present text tries to analyse the relation among po-
litical power, corruption, criminal groups and intelligence agencies, and their 
role in the development of narco-trafficking and violence in Mexico. This text 
attempts to unravel the following questions: Why are the drug traffickers able 
to destabilize the government? how much responsibility does the Us and 
Mexican intelligence agencies have in the development of the violence in Mex-
ico? can Mexico by itself control the development of drug trafficking? Will it 
be possible to establish the rule of law and accountability mechanisms under 
the government of andrés Manuel López Obrador? The main hypothesis set 
out in this text is a possible correlation between corruption and increase of 
criminal activities such as narcotrafficking. The corruption described in the 
text is oriented towards the political elites and intelligence agencies, which 
hypothetically have eased the development of the narcotrafficking and vio-
lence in Mexican. The present text follows a descriptive methodology based 
on qualitative and quantitative data, press publications, articles, global reports 
and academic information. 
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A brief background of narcotrafficking in Mexico: 
The role of U.S. agencies 
The development of drug trafficking in Mexico can be traced after the 1920’s, 
when marijuana and opium production started to be exported to the U.s.a. 
Opium production was introduced to Mexico by chinese immigrants, nota-
bly by antonio Wong Yin, who was a “compadre” – godfather – of governor 
of coahuila, nazario Ortiz Garza (1929–1933). he was also close to General 
Jesús García Gutiérrez, who was in charge of military operations in the state at 
that time (astorga 1999: 13). 
In the United states up until the early 1900’s, opium, cocaine, marijuana 
and alcohol were legal and they could be purchased at pharmacies and stores. 
In 1914, the harrison act was passed, prohibiting the sale of opium, mor-
phine, and cocaine (redmond 2013). at the same time, the Mexican revo-
lution (1910–1917) was taking place, and revolutionary leaders in Mexico 
were more interested in institutionalizing the political life than in control-
ling opium trafficking (astorga 1999: 11). Following the end of the second 
World War (1939–1945), the U.s. government launched an intensive cam-
paign against opium production in an attempt to control the addiction of 
soldiers returning from war. In order to enforce prohibition, the american 
state created new law enforcement agencies that over time became politi-
cally and financially involved in the continuation of prohibitionist drug poli-
cies. The central Intelligence agency (cIa) was established in 1947, and the 
drug enforcement administration (dea) was founded in 1973 (Buendía 
1983). In the same year 1947, in Mexico, president Miguel alemán Valdés 
(1946–1952) created the security Federal directorate (dirección Federal de 
seguridad – dFs), as a police force with the power to intervene in drug is-
sues. The drug policy, traditionally managed by the department of health in 
Mexico, was transferred to the attorney General Office (procuraduría Gen-
eral de la república – pGr) also in the same year (astorga 1999: 12). The 
dFs was in part a cIa creation, and the cIa presence in the dFs became so 
dominant for its intelligence that only “american eyes” could see and report 
operations of the dFs, as the famous Mexican journalist Manuel Buendía 
used to say (Buendía 1983: 24). 
For dale scott, the complexity of the narcotrafficking in Mexico re-
sponds to the complexity of the narcotrafficking worldwide and its links 
with the U.s intelligence. according to dale, there are three levels to see the 
phenomenon of narcotrafficking. The first one is “the demand side”, which is 
related to consumers, mainly in rich countries. The second one is “the supply 
side”, which is related to production and distribution of drugs, particularly 
in deprived communities. The third one is “the protected intelligence-drug 
connection” (dale 2000: 2). dale focuses his analysis of the development of 
narcotrafficking on the third factor, the one related to the protected intelli-
gence-drug connection: 
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intelligence-drug connection, or what I call government-drug symbiosis, has 
been responsible for the biggest changes in the patterns and level of drug-
trafficking (...) researchers are becoming aware of a third aspect to the prob-
lem: protected intelligence drug connections. Within the U.S. governmental 
bureaucracy itself, intelligence agencies and special warfare elements have 
recurrently exploited drug traffickers and their corrupt political allies for 
anti-communist or anti-subversive operations (...) to strengthen right-wing 
power (...) One sees elsewhere this recurring pattern of CIA collaboration 
with intelligence and security networks who are allied with the biggest drug 
traffickers, not opposed to them. (dale 2000: 2–4) 
according to dale, the “War on drugs” is one of the narratives of the U.s. 
security agencies to justify their presence abroad and get financial resources 
from the U.s congress: “This hypocrisy of ‘anti-drug campaigns’ dates back to 
1974, the year when congress cut back U.s aid programs to repressive Latin 
american police forces, and then beefed up so-called anti-narcotics aid to the 
same forces by about the same amount. to keep the aid coming, corrupt Latin 
american politicians helped to invent the spectre of the drug-financed narco-
guerrillas” (dale 2000: 3). dale takes the case of Mexico to illustrate the “cIa-
drug symbiosis”: “In Mexico, for example, the cIa’s closest government allies 
were for years in the dFs or dirección Federal de seguridad, whose badges, 
handed out to top-level Mexican drug-traffickers, have been labelled by dea 
agents a  virtual ‘licence to traffic’ (dale 2000: 3)”. Therefore, during many 
years, “the arrest of narcotraffickers in Mexico was determined by a change 
of U.s. priorities and de facto alliances made with new drug figures”, as U.s. 
intelligence agencies have always exploited traffickers and corrupt political 
elites to their own interest (dale 2000: 2–3). 
On the other hand, the predominance of Us intelligence agencies over 
their counterpart in Mexico is overwhelming. The Us has never respected 
Mexican sovereignty. The Us department of treasury, the forerunner of the 
dea, can send agents into Mexico without permission to gather intelligence 
on drug smugglers and to arrest and extradite suspects as they wish. On the 
opposite way, Mexican officials require a  visa to enter the United states to 
carry out the same activities, and the state department and the Bureau of 
narcotics can turn down the request. Mexico does not have this prerogative. 
This double standard is still in effect today (redmond 2013). The geographical 
proximity between Mexico and the United states is critical in the development 
of drug trafficking, the first as a producer and transit territory, and the second 
as a consumer and final destination. exports of Mexican opium, heroin, and 
marijuana for the Us consumption have increased due to the laws prohibiting 
these products and the Vietnam War (1955–1975) (redmond 2013). 
The production and trade of drugs has been developed under the umbrella 
of the Us and Mexican authorities since the beginning. an example of the 
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cIa-drug alliance is the cartel of Guadalajara, which was the most power-
ful cartel in the early 1980’s and it enjoyed protection of the dFs, under its 
chief Miguel nazar haro (1978–1982). nazar was a cIa asset. he led a dirty 
war against leftist insurgents and political opponents. another example was 
José antonio Zorrilla, former chief of the dFs during Miguel de la Madrid 
government (1982–1988), who provided credentials to traffic to rafael caro 
Quintero, leader of the cartel of Guadalajara. Zorrilla was a  cIa asset too 
(dale 2000).
The narcotrafficking under the Mexican political system
people who tried autonomous strategies for producing or smuggling drugs 
in Mexico did not last very long or just survived modestly, since the big drug 
business was dominated by high-ranking members of the anti-narcotics po-
lice and political elites during the ruling of the Institutional revolutionary 
party (prI)1. every time there was a drug scandal involving Mexican politi-
cians, nobody was ever prosecuted. The protection of the establishment was 
paramount, and any arising conflict was negotiated inside of the political elite, 
particularly through the prI. It is important to remember that the prI was 
created to institutionalize political and social demands and group all caudillos 
– local leaders – under the umbrella of one political party through its corpo-
rate structure (anguiano 1975: 136–137). The corporate structure of the prI 
was developed by grouping the national peasant confederation (cnc), the 
confederation of Mexican Workers (ctM) and the national confederation of 
the popular Organisations (cnOp). The prI operated as an engine of political 
control, a channel for managing social demands, a machine for political mo-
bility and a centre to control criminal groups (aguayo 2000). 
Thus, the prI monopolised virtually all levels of government for 71 years 
(1929–2000). The prI also maintained a relative peace in Mexico compared 
to other countries in Latin america, integrating political dissidents, generals 
and caudillos into the political system, without ever resorting to armed force. 
criminal groups were subordinated to the political power to “get a credential 
to operate”. any insubordination was viewed as treason against the political 
system, and the rule of law was applied against them, as an old popular Mexi-
can saying goes: “application of the law for my enemies, and the protection 
– impunity – for my friends” (nieto 2011). 
another pillar of the Mexican system was the formal – written laws – and 
informal – unwritten laws and political agreements – powers of the president, 
1 The National Revolutionary Party (PNR) was created in 1929 under the administration of 
Plutarco Elías Calles (1877–1945). It was renamed the Mexican Revolutionary Party in 1938 under 
the government of Lázaro Cárdenas, and in 1946, during the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho 
(1897–1995), it became the PRI (Aguayo 2000).
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Besides, another pillar of the post-revolutionary Mexican system was corrup-
tion, which became an essential element, not only in building this contempo-
rary political system, but also in nourishing loyalties among members of the 
prI, integrating dissidents, keeping the control on other parties and control-
ling criminal groups. criminal groups needed to have a “special licence” to 
operate across the country. Many of these licences were granted for family, po-
litical or financial favours. For example, a criminal could pay for the political 
campaign of a politician at local, regional and national level; in exchange the 
trafficker could continue operating without police intervention. The crimi-
nals were also in charge of keeping the peace in areas where they operated, 
otherwise the agreement between politicians and criminal was broken, and 
traffickers would end up in prison. In that way, the prI and political elites 
used the fruits of corruption and illegal drug trade as a source of power to 
nourish political clientelism, and to obtain legitimacy among the population 
(nieto 2011). criminals were also in charge of funding community parties 
and creating social infrastructure for leisure activities, roads, local clinics, re-
furbishment of local churches and other community facilities in the villages, 
where their business was based as a way to distribute some of their wealth, 
thanks to which the villagers gave them their approval, protection, respect and 
legitimacy. The corruption2 was embodied in the Mexican post-revolutionary 
political system and tolerated by both, the political elites and the citizens. 
as alan riding used to say, “the corruption is the oil that moves the Mexican 
political system” (riding 1985: 140). as astorga indicates, the development of 
drug trafficking was controlled, tolerated and regulated by the politicians, and 
it was developed inside the power structure, the drug traffickers were a sort of 
a new class of outlaws that depended closely on political and police protection 
(astorga 1999: 13). The marriage between political power, corruption, and 
development of drug trafficking continued for almost the same period as the 
Mexican post-revolutionary political system (1929–2000), including the prI, 
the traditional corporatist structure, and extra attributions of the president. 
The double discourse of the fight against corruption prevailed during many 
decades, and many presidents used the discourse against corruption as a way 
to distinguish themselves from their predecessors, to renew faith in the ideals 
of the revolution and gain social legitimacy. It was a ritual carried on every 
six years, which diverted from a real interest in reducing corruption and im-
plementing the rule of law. as Morris says: “among the effects, the structural 
imbalances enabled the president to use corruption to cement the ties wed-
2  The term corruption is taken as the abuse of public power for private purposes. This defini-
tion assumes the distinction between public and private roles. In many societies the frontier between 
both spheres is not very clear and it seems to be natural to give some gifts in exchange of assigning 
contracts and jobs. However, in developed societies the difference between the two spaces is more 
pronounced. (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 91).
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ding the political elite, reward those abiding by the informal rules of the game 
and punish those who did not and even co-opt those potentially threatening 
the system” (Morris 2009: 1).
an example of the double discourse of the fight against corruption was the 
government of José López portillo (1976–1982), as he emphasized his will to 
fight against corruption on several occasions. however, his government would 
end up in the middle of many corruption and drug trafficking scandals. ar-
turo durazo Moreno (1976–1982), an old friend of López portillo, was ap-
pointed as head of the General directorate of police and traffic (Dirección 
General de Policía y Tránsito) in Mexico city. durazo Moreno transformed 
this institution into a centre of corruption, drug trafficking and trade of arms. 
he also sent police officers to rob banks and extort financial resources from 
citizens for personal gain. during his ruling, durazo built himself a Us $2.5 
million mansion on the outskirts of Mexico city, with a horseracing track and 
a replica of the studio 54 discotheque in new York, and in the pacific coast 
resort of Zihuatanejo, his cliff-top retreat, complete with classical columns, 
nicknamed the parthenon – a copy of the Greek parthenon – (Gunson 2000). 
alan riding used to say: “durazo converted the police into a  racketeering 
empire that made his predecessors’ performances seem positively innocuous” 
(riding 1985).
A change of economic model and political elites 
The government of Miguel de la Madrid hurtado (1982–1988) introduced 
a new economic model, neoliberalism, which replaced the import substitu-
tion model based on protectionist policies and domestic production. The im-
port substitution model was viewed as the main cause of the economic crises 
of the 1980’s, not only in Mexico, but also around the world. new theories of 
free market, privatization of state companies and free trade flourished in the 
United states and the United Kingdom, led by ronald reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher. In Mexico, de la Madrid was another supporter of these theories, 
and his successor carlos salinas de Gortari (1988–1994) implemented it fully3. 
The neoliberal economic reforms transformed Mexico into a giant “free 
market.” The passage of the north american Free trade agreement (naFta) 
in 1994 had the effect of making Mexico heavily dependent on and more inte-
grated with the Us economy. By 2006, around 85 % of Mexico’s exports were 
sold in the United states (redmond 2013). according to redmond, for Mexi-
can workers and farmers, naFta was like a housing collapse. In the first year 
3  neoliberalism: a  late 20th century revised “liberalism” that seeks to transfer economic 
wealth from the hands of the state to the private sector, also called the “Washington consensus”, 
because the key mechanisms for imposing fiscal discipline are the Us-based International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other financial institutions (Meade 2010: 343). 
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8 million unemployed and five million people working in the informal econ-
omy. Workers in foreign-owned export assembly plants called maquiladoras 
earned six dollars a day. That wage left millions of Mexican families living in 
poverty (redmond 2013). as a condition of membership in naFta, Mexico 
was forced to eliminate the system of communal land sharing known as ejido 
– indigenous ownership form inherited by the aztec social organization –, 
leaving thousands of peasants without any income and in absolute poverty 
(redmond 2013). at the same time, the prI lost more and more credibility 
and legitimacy to continue operating, since the national peasant confedera-
tion (cnc) and the confederation of Mexican Workers (ctM) were unable 
to restore loyalties, submission and legitimacy among peasants and workers. 
Many of them migrated to the Us and others looked for another sort of in-
come in the informal market. Thousands of police officers and special forces 
belonging to the federal police and judicial police were fired, and the police 
forces were dismantled as a part of the program to reduce the size of the state 
and restructure the police. Later, these ex-officers, as well as peasants and 
street children, were recruited for the organized crime. Guerrillas and armed 
movements flourished in different parts of Mexico: Guerrero, Oaxaca, and the 
most known in chiapas, through the Zapatista army of national Liberation 
(ejército Zapatista de Liberación nacional – eZLn) – led by el comandante 
Marcos. The Zapatista army went public on January 1, 1994, the same day that 
naFta came into effect (aguayo 2000). The government of carlos salinas 
de Gortari was closely related to the Golfo cartel, led by Juan García Ábrego. 
The relation of carlos salinas’ brother, raúl salinas de Gortari, with this cartel 
was widely known in the media at that time. according to helen redmond, 
naFta created not only a new billionaire business elite in Mexico like carlos 
slim4, but also narco-businessmen like Joaquín “el chapo” Guzmán Loera, 
the ceO of the sinaloa drug cartel. he made the Forbes billionaire list four 
times and his fortune was between one and ten billion dollars. “el chapo”, 
a capitalist innovator of new drugs, saw the potential for huge profits in the 
methamphetamine market and set up super-laboratories close to the Us bor-
der (redmond 2013). The “narco-business” also created new rich families re-
lated to national politics such as raul salinas de Gortari, brother of carlos 
salinas, former Mexican president, and his family. In 1995, swiss authorities 
found $110 Us million in accounts linked to raul salinas. The money-laun-
dering proceedings against him began. swiss detectives alleged that the funds 
were related to drug trafficking (Grillo 2013: 258). 
4 carlos slim helú is a Mexican business magnate and investor. From 2010 to 2013, slim 
was ranked as the richest person in the world. he derived his fortune from his extensive holdings 
in a considerable number of Mexican companies through his conglomerate telmex, américa 
Móvil, samsung Mexico and Grupo carso. By July 31, 2016, he was the number 7 on Forbes list 
of billionaires with a net worth estimated at $52.5 billion of Us dollars (Forbes 2016). 
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The development of narcotrafficking in Mexico was also benefited by the 
control of the Us authorities over south Florida and the caribbean, which 
helped to reduce the entrance of drugs to Us territory. Then, colombian or-
ganizations began forming alliances with drug traffickers based in Mexico to 
transport cocaine to the United states using Mexico as a route of contact, and 
soon the Mexican cartels gained autonomy with respect to the colombians 
(Grillo 2013). The presence of the cartels’ power in Mexico was each time 
more visible. The government of ernesto Zedillo ponce de León (1994–2000) 
soon reflected the influence of the narcotrafficking business. Following the 
neoliberal school, ernesto Zedillo continued to privatize state companies and 
suppress peasants’ movements. In chiapas, in the south of Mexico, on de-
cember 22, 1997, 45 people, among them pregnant women and children, were 
brutally slaughtered, while attending a prayer service in a local church. This 
event was known as “the acteal massacre”. In 1994, the government of Zedillo 
was marked by the murder of donaldo colosio Murrieta, a candidate for the 
prI presidency, during his political campaign. some hypothesis indicates that 
his murder was due to his will to fight corruption and impunity: “¡es la hora 
de cerrarle el paso al influyentismo, a la corrupción y a la impunidad!” – “It is 
time to close the way to influential people, corruption and impunity!” (ram-
ales 2005). Other political figures, who were murdered due to their alleged 
links with the narcotrafficking were José Francisco ruiz Massieu, ex-governor 
of Guerrero, his brother Mario ruíz Massieu, ex-attorney of the country, and 
paco stanley, a member of the Mexican show biz. simultaneously, other mem-
ber of the political elite such as the governor of Quinta roo, Mario Villanueva 
Madrid (1993–1999), was arrested by orders of the drug enforcement ad-
ministration (dea), after he eased the transport of drugs from colombia to 
Mexico and then to the Us (ramales 2005).
The political transition and the breakage of loyalties
The arrival of Vicente Fox in 2000 to the Mexican presidency, as the candidate 
of the national action party (partido de acción nacional, pan), broke the prI’s 
seventy-one-year hold on power as well as it broke the informal and formal 
presidential attributions, opening a new period of democracy. however, simul-
taneously, Fox opened “the pandora box”, releasing the dark forces that had been 
controlled until then by the supremacy of the prI: the narcotraffickers. 
as Morris explains, before the 1940s, governors of drug-producing and 
trafficking states had the power to control illegal business in their territo-
ries. after 1947, anti-drug agents and the military had direct responsibility 
for fighting traffickers and the possibility of being institutional mediators be-
tween traffickers and political power. neither traffickers nor mediators were 
autonomous: they were both subordinated to political power. The crackdown 
of the political regime governed by the prI has provoked cascade effects on 
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disrupted the mechanisms of political control creating other conflicts between 
traffickers and political institutions. Institutional mediators such as police and 
military members can now be more autonomous than ever, and able of play-
ing for their own interests without political commitments (Morris 2009: 33). 
The image 1 illustrates, in a simple way, how the power was distributed and the 
fruits of corruption flowed constantly, keeping the post-revolutionary Mexican 
political system in relative harmony for almost seven decades between citizens, 
criminal groups, political leaders and political bureaucrats, including the police 
forces and members of the army. at the top of the pyramid was the president. 
Image 1. 
power distributed under 
post-revolutionary Mexican 
political system
Image 2. 
power distributed under 
neoliberal system
source: nieto, nubia (2004), La géopolitique de la corruption. Le Mexique: une étude de cas, 
ph.d. Thesis, paris I, La sorbonne, France; rivelois, Jean (1999b), Drogue et pouvoirs: du 
Mexique aux paradis, paris, L’harmattan.
source: nieto, nubia (2004), La géopolitique de la corruption. Le Mexique: une étude de cas, 
ph.d. Thesis, paris I, La sorbonne, France; rivelois Jean (1999b), Drogue et pouvoirs: du 
Mexique aux paradis, paris, L’harmattan. 
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As Morris explains, before the 1940s, governors of drug-producing and trafficking states 
had the power to control illegal business in their territories. After 1947, anti-drug agents and the 
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mediators between traffickers and political power. Neither traffickers nor mediators were 
autonomous: they were both subordinated to political power. The crackdown of the political 
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Following the dismantling of the corporatist system of the PRI, the drug traffickers have 
obtained more autonomy to operate independently, and without restrictions of the political 
bureaucracy, including the police and army generals, as can be seen on the image 2. By doing 
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this, the Mexican State is confronted to equal level or even superior, by the “Narco-state” which 
has guns of higher calibre than the Mexican army, money and global power to confront national 
authorities.  
Image 2. Power distributed under neoliberal system. 
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Mexique aux paradis, Paris, L'Harmattan.   
 
What’s more, the corruption is no longer distributive like in the post-revolutionary period, but 
rather elitist, therefore the ordinary citizens do not see any advantage of it. Local representatives 
of different parties are unable to hold loyalties of citizens, and citizens have more immediate and 
concrete demands. On the other hand, the Narco-state is led by drug cartels’ lords, who reinforce 
their power by local crime cells using violence, torture, intimidation, kidnapping, selling 
protection for small business, among other methods of subjugation, without forgetting that 
narcotraffickers have financial resources to buy people, politicians and police forces.   
As Jean Rivelois describes: “Today, the economic power of the Liberal State is less due 
to the fact that there is less money in the State, and less money to distribute among corruptive 
authorities. The opportunities for social distribution of fruits of corruption are diminishing. The 
corruption becomes more and more elitist” (Rivelois 1999a: 294). For Rivelois, the New 
Mexican State continues being structured by client relations, but it is limited in its capacity to 
feed its social clients, which generates a problem of legitimacy for the political powers and a 
problem of the tolerance of corruption among citizens (Rivelois 1999a: 294).  
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Following the dismantling of the corporatist system of the prI, the drug 
traffickers have obtained more autonomy to operate independently and wi-
thout restrictions of the political bureaucracy, including the police and army 
generals, as can be seen on the image 2. By doing this, the Mexican state is 
confronted to equal level or even superior, by the “narco-state” which has 
guns of higher calibre than the Mexican army, money and global power to 
confront national authorities. 
What’s more, the corruption is no longer distributive like in the post-rev-
olutionary period, but rather elitist, therefore the ordinary citizens do not see 
any advantage of it. Local representatives of different parties are unable to hold 
loyalties of citizens, and citizens have more immediate and concrete demands. 
On the other hand, the narco-state is led by drug cartels’ lords, who reinforce 
their power by local crime cells using violence, torture, intimidation, kidnap-
ping, selling protection for small business, among other methods of subjuga-
tion, without forgetting that narcotraffickers have financial resources to buy 
people, politicians and police forces. 
as Jean rivelois describes: “today, the economic power of the Liberal state 
is less due to the fact that there is less money in the state, and less money to dis-
tribute among corruptive authorities. The opportunities for social distribution 
of fruits of corruption are diminishing. The corruption becomes more and more 
elitist” (rivelois 1999a: 294). For rivelois, the new Mexican state continues be-
ing structured by client relations, but it is limited in its capacity to feed its social 
clients, which generates a problem of legitimacy for the political powers and 
a problem of the tolerance of corruption among citizens (rivelois 1999a: 294). 
certainly, up to the 1990s the structure of political power, based on the 
prI, could demand a  rent in exchange of turning a  blind eye on the drug 
business, and provide state infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications, 
information and even protection from the police and army. however, after the 
2000, without the political pyramid of the prI and the increased power of the 
drug trafficking, they started to build a narco-state5 in parallel to the political 
state (santos and Bustos 2009: 2).
Drug trafficking is a criminal activity that generates a large number of 
crimes. Many traffickers and illegal organizations (cartels) have been able to 
accumulate enormous fortunes and material means, which has given them 
a position of strength that allows them not only to avoid the rule of law, but 
also to become centres of parallel power (santos and Bustos 2009: 2).
The Government of Felipe calderón (2006–2012) saw an unprecedented 
level of violence, after he promised to eliminate drug cartels in the national 
5  The Narco-State: It is the construction of the State that has been taken over and is controlled 
and corrupted by drug cartels, and where law enforcement is effectively inexistent or barely inexis-
tent (Rivelois 1999a) [translation from French language].
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released on the same year (santos and Bustos 2009: 8). calderón faced the 
pressure of the U.s. regarding the increase of drug trafficking in Mexico, since 
Vicente Fox, his predecessor, avoided tackling the problem. Fox sent just a few 
troops to nuevo Laredo –the border between Mexico and the Us–, but most 
of the troops died fighting against the Golfo cartel and sinaloa cartel. 
In december 2006, president Felipe calderón sent 6,500 troops to Mi-
choacán, where violence was more notorious. Later he would send 45,000 
members of the army, plus members of the local and national police, but the 
strength of drug traffickers proved to be more effective. From 2006 to 2012 
president calderón waged a U.s.-backed offensive against drug cartels. Fight-
ing between rival gangs and the security forces led to between 47,000 and 
70,000 deaths. More than 20,000 disappeared and a quarter million people 
were displaced. What’s more, calderón brought the military involvement to 
unprecedented levels. By 2011, there were 96,000 soldiers and 16,000 Mexican 
marines in the campaign against cartels, which only exacerbated the violence 
(Grillo 2013: 253–260). 
The arrival of enrique peña nieto (2012–2017), the candidate of the prI 
to the Mexican presidency, was an attempt to re-establish peace in the coun-
try and negotiations with the drug cartels’ lords. since the beginning of his 
government, peña nieto switched his priorities from talking about security to 
focusing on the economy and reducing violence (Grillo 2013). 
however, the outcome was not very optimistic. The violence in Mexico con-
tinues being high. The executive directorate of the national security system 
(secretariado ejecutivo del sistema nacional de seguridad pública – sesnsp), 
belonging to the Ministry of national defense (secretaría de la defensa nacion-
al-sedena) reported by October 31, 2016 an annual figure of 32 thousand 662 
killings (Luna 2016: 4–5), and the figure does not seem to reduce. according to 
the council on Foreign relations (cFr) the number of deaths since 2006 due to 
the organized criminal violence in Mexico goes from 80,000 to 100,000 people 
until 2017 (cFr 2018), which shows the extent of the problem and the failure of 
the measures to fight against this global phenomenon. 
The drug market, as any other business, is regulated by the market rules, 
which consider the levels of risk calculated as investment expenditure in com-
parison with the levels of profitability. The value of the drug market in the 
United states is estimated in the range of $30 to $150 billion. drug violence 
is not “goons just shooting each other”. This is a big business, as canales says: 
“drug cartels are incredibly complex organizations that have well-defined 
structures, that are able to coordinate the movement of supplies from all 
around the world and that must also guarantee the delivery of their product 
to the lucrative markets in the United states. currently, there are an estimated 
55 million users of illegal drugs in the United states and, together, they make 
up half of the global demand for illegal substances” (canales 2012). nowa-
days, there are a  few powerful cartels, but there are more criminal cells as 
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the structure of the cartels continues evolving and adapting to the new global 
needs and trends. For example, the new criminal cells act more independently, 
they hire or outsource services to other criminal cells, rather than provid-
ing all services by themselves (davila 2016). however, some cartels sell their 
brand as a franchise to small cells in order to operate in their local towns or 
regions. 
according to the Mexican press, Mexico is controlled by three cartels: 
the cartel of pacífico (previously named cartel of sinaloa), the cartel of Bel-
trán Leyva and the cartel of Jalisco new Generation ( cJnG) (García 2018). 
The cJnG controls the main tourist destinations such as acapulco, Ixtapa, 
Veracruz and puerto Vallarta. The cJnG also controls the states of colima, 
Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Morelos, nayarit, Michoacán and Veracruz and 
it has huge presence in Baja california, Baja california sur, durango, chihua-
hua, coahuila, sinaloa (García 2018). 
however, it is recognized that there are other cartels – with less global 
operations and logistic scope, but equally aggressive and brutal – which fight 
to control similar regions and places, such as Los Zetas and Los Mata Zetas 
new Generation cartel, the noreste cartel, Los Viagras, Los h3, the Guerre-
ros Unidos cartel, whose members were part of the Beltrán Leyva cartel, the 
Milenio cartel, La familia Michoacana, the Beltrán Leyva cartel, Los negros, 
La Mano con Ojos, the colima cartel, the tijuana cartel, the Juárez cartel, 
the acapulco cartel and the caballeros templarios-Guardia Michoacana car-
tel, among the most notorious (davila 2016). according to the council on 
Foreign relations, it is estimated that there are over 200 drug trafficking cells 
in Mexico (cFr 2018).
In an interview with celerino castillo, a former agent of the drug enforce-
ment administration (dea), in the state of tamaulipas – the northeast of 
Mexico –, he indicates that the main cartels outsource or hire other services 
to other criminal groups to reduce costs generated by paying bribes in order 
to maximize profits. he says, for example, “the Golfo cartel outsource to the 
criminal cells of the Metros in reynosa or to the rojos in Matamoros, or to the 
dragons in tampico. as well as, to the Fresitas and the cyclons in tampico” 
(redacción 2016b: 3).
today, the drug trafficking in the Mexican republic is one of the most 
serious problems facing the Mexican government and putting national secu-
rity at risk (santos and Bustos 2009: 4). Gun battles between security forces 
and cartel gunmen have terrified citizens, rather than making them feel safer. 
residents, workers, and schoolchildren are frightened, when fire fights last 
hours in broad daylight. Worse, the security forces killed dozens of civilians, 
who failed to stop at checkpoints or were in the line of fire. soldiers and nar-
cotraffickers have been accused of widespread human rights abuses, including 
torture, rape, and murder of those people, who they detain, arrest or capture. 
On the other hand, the laxity of american gun laws does not help to reduce 
violence and narcotrafficking in Mexico. The Us gun trade is a huge business 
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industries in the U.s. “Just in 2015, arms sector generated $49.3 billons, cre-
ated 21,000 new jobs, and brought $6.2 billons taxes to the Us. Government” 
(Fernándes 2017).
In recent years, Mexican cartels have improved their weaponry power. ac-
cording to the Mexican Ministry of national defence (secretaría de la defen-
sa nacional-sedena) 70% of the weapons of cartels come from the United 
states. since 2012 until June 2015 the government has seized 19,848 guns, all 
for exclusive use of the armed forces. Most of the weapons were seized in chi-
huahua, Baja california, Michoacán, tamaulipas Guerrero, state of Mexico, 
sonora and nuevo León. according to Gomora, almost 60% of drug traffick-
ers’ weapons are .223 calibre rifles, a  civilian version of the M16 of the Us 
army and aK 47 so-called “goat horns” (Gomora 2016). 
Following the report, from 2009 to 2014, 49,566 long guns and shotguns 
were seized and traced, according to their origin of manufacturing. during 
the same period, 53,156 short guns, including revolvers and pistols, were also 
seized and analysed. The result shows that most of them come from the Us, 
particularly from the southwest, border states of texas, california and ari-
zona. The logistic capability of many cartels is supported by helicopters, sub-
marines and radars to be able to fight with Mexico’s federal government on 
equal basis (Gomora 2016).
The entrance of firearms in Mexico becomes also more complex. From 
a  sample of 104,850 firearms seized by Mexican authorities and submitted 
for tracing between 2009 and 2014, the United states reach the top of the six 
countries of firearms seized and traced in Mexico, the others countries are 
spain (3,786), china (3,027), Italy (2,186), Germany (1,522) and romania 
(1,287) (Gomora 2016).
perhaps it is important to underline that in Mexico gun ownership is regu-
lated by the state6, even more, in recent years the Mexican senate approved on 
december 15, 2016 a new law that condemns illegal carrying of weapons with 
penalty ranging from six months to 30 years in prison for those who carry 
weapons (cardoso 2016c: 16).
For celerino castillo, a former agent of the dea, “the problem facing the 
United states is not so much about drug trafficking, but its addiction to money”. 
In this regard, it should be noted that from 2010 to 2012, more than 253,000 
weapons were used in the northern border of Mexico, which were acquired in 
the licit and illicit Us market, resulting in gains for the Us arms industry, giv-
ing profits to the Us firearms industry just for this amount of guns of around 
6  The Mexican constitution grants the right to use guns to citizens, but under the state con-
trol, as it says in the article 10: “ The inhabitants of the United Mexican states are free to possess 
arms of any kind, for their security and self-defence, made exception of those prohibited by law 
and those ones that the nation reserves for the exclusive use of the army, national Guard army; 
but they –inhabitants– will not be able to carry them in the towns without being subject to police 
regulations” (constitución 1917).
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127 million of Us dollars – around 2 thousand 400 million of Mexican pesos. 
The weapons that arrive from the United states to the Mexican army most of 
the times end up in the hands of organized crime (redacción 2016b: 3). The 
development of the narcotrafficking in Mexico is a result of the high levels of 
corruption in the country, without forgetting the responsibility of Us authori-
ties, as castillo put it “without the approval of the authorities, these businesses 
could not be possible” (redacción 2016b: 3). For peter dale, the development 
of the narcotrafficking is due to “the protected intelligence-drug connections”. 
For example, dale says, “The Guadalajara cartel, Mexico’s most powerful 
drug-trafficking network in the early 1980s, prospered largely because it en-
joyed Mexican and Us protection. Under these circumstances, members of 
the Guadalajara cartel became prominent among the drug-trafficking sup-
porters of the cIa’s contra operation” (dale 2000: 2).
The increase of local powers and corruption
after the year 2000, the following presidents of the country opened the door 
to the implementation of federalist policies as a way to implement social 
democratic demands. however, the federalist principle also trigged other 
consequences for the development of corruption and drug trafficking, as 
enrique Krauze put it: “we pass from an imperial presidency to imperial 
caciques” (Krauze 2016). according to Krauze, the imperial caciques are 
represented by state governors, state directors of the judicial and federal po-
lice and local authorities. It is no coincidence that in those Mexican states, 
which present high levels of public debt, corruption and impunity, there are 
also high levels of violence and narcotrafficking disputes. For example, the 
ex-governors of coahuila (humberto Moreira 2005–2011), durango (Jorge 
herrera 2010–2016), nuevo León (rodrigo Medina 2009–2015), tamauli-
pas (egidio torre 2011–2016), chihuahua (césar duarte 2010–2016), Ver-
acruz (Javier duarte 2010–2016) and sonora (Guillermo padrés 2009–2015) 
have created a  public debt of 186,553 million of Mexican pesos (around 
9.70 billion Us dollars). The public debt registered by those governors is 20.6 
times higher than the total budget allocated for the agriculture, 909.9 times 
higher than the 205 million Mexican pesos (around 9.97 million Us dol-
lars) allocated for the national Institute for Women, and 709.2 times bigger 
than the 263 million Mexican pesos (about 12.8 million Us dollars) assigned 
to the fund for the help of immigrants (cardoso 2016a: 6–7)7. parallelly, 
the same states also present high levels of violence. several of the Mexican 
governors, who were mentioned earlier are also involved in cases of cor-
ruption, money laundering and are linked with narcotrafficking. a case in 
7  The average Mexican exchange rate as of November 2016: one US dollar equal to 20.5720 
Mexican pesos (Global currencies 2018). 
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arrested by the spanish government in January 2016 on charges of money 
laundering and embezzlement during his term as governor of the coahuila 
state. however, in Mexico, Moreira did not have any record of corruption. 
he was a  former president of the prI in 2011 with a “transparent reputa-
tion”. after negotiations taken up by the Mexican government in defence of 
Moreira, he was released, and he abandoned spain immediately. Then, in 
Mexico, he wanted to be re-elected as a local deputy of the prI in coahuila 
in the elections held on June 4, 2017, but he stopped his political ambition 
after local pressures (del Llano 2016).
since 2006, the fight against narcotrafficking at local and national level 
has been carried out by local and national police grouped by preventive and 
judicial police, which can be federal, state or municipal police, and by the 
Mexican army forces, which are composed by the army, the air Force, and the 
navy (constitución 2017). The Mexican political constitution promulgated 
in 1917 establishes in the article 13 military jurisdiction and determines its 
scope. The article 129 indicates that in times of peace, no military authority 
can exercise more functions than those that are exactly in connection with 
military discipline: “In times of peace, no military authority can exercise more 
functions than those that have an exact connection with military discipline. 
There will only be military basis fixed and permanent in castles, fortresses and 
warehouses that depend immediately on the congress” (constitución 2017). 
The  article 29 of the constitution regulates the suspension of fundamental 
rights by orders of the executive power, with the approval of congress, in 
case of situations or states of emergency (constitución 2017). On the other 
hand, the articles 16, 29, 89, fraction VI, and 129 of the Mexican constitution 
indicate that it is possible that the army, air Force and navy at times when 
no suspension of guarantees has been decreed, may act in support of civil au-
thorities in various tasks of public security (carbonell 2002). 
however, in recent times, “civil liberties groups, journalists, and others 
have criticized the Mexican government’s war against cartels for years. a 2016 
human rights Watch report says that Mexico’s security forces have been linked 
to the extrajudicial killing of thousands of civilians and the disappearances of 
twenty-seven thousand people since 2006” (cFr 2018). There are many exam-
ples of abuses perpetrated by the army, some known by the national and in-
ternational public, and other ones that have passed unnoticed by the press, for 
example, “mass protests erupted across the country in 2014 after forty-three 
students disappeared in the town of Iguala, in the state of Guerrero, following 
deadly clashes with local police. Mexican investigators found that the police 
handed the students over to a local drug gang at the behest of the mayor, who 
had ties to the gang. The incident showed “a failure of the political system to 
root out close links between the cartels and political parties” (cFr 2018). 
certainly, the role of the Mexican army has been highly questioned in 
the process of fighting against narcotrafficking due to the numerous human 
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rights abuses and high levels of corruption inside of the police and army 
hierarchy, but it is well recognised that the navy, which did not enjoy high 
levels of social and political prestige during decades, has showed to be more 
efficient at fighting organised crime. The Mexican intelligence services co-
ordinated by the Ministry of national defence (sedena), the executive 
directorate of the national security system (sesnsp) and the national 
security research center (centro de Investigación y  seguridad nacional 
–cIsen)8 have also worked closely with the Mexican army at fighting nar-
cotrafficking. nevertheless, the narcotraffickers continue being strong and 
present in the whole country. 
Conclusions
The narcotrafficking in Mexico has been developed hand in hand with cor-
ruption. together, they have perverted not only the political regime, the na-
tional security, the social peace, but also they have perverted the democratic 
process and the development of the country. There are many factors that have 
contributed to the development of narcotrafficking and violence in Mexico 
at both international and national level. among international factors are 
“the protected intelligence-drug connections”, a  global trade phenomenon, 
a business that generates huge revenues, and a business which is connect-
ed to other complex criminal activities such as gun trafficking and human 
trafficking. at a national level, the development of narcotrafficking has been 
easier because of the dismantling of the social and political pyramid of the 
prI’s structure, as well as high levels of corruption and impunity inside of the 
public institutions, together with other factors such as high levels of social 
inequality, poverty and unemployment, poor performance of the rule of law, 
historical agrarian conflicts, lack of opportunities for social mobility based 
on meritocracy, without forgetting the disconnection between political elites 
and average citizens, the cynicism and opportunism of politicians and the 
wrong perception among political elites about public function, considered as 
an opportunity to create personal wealth instead of an opportunity to serve 
and help to enrich public service. 
The financial perspective cannot be forgotten as it is a key factor, which has 
facilitated the development of the narcotrafficking in Mexico not only because 
of the huge revenues, which drug markets generate for the cartels, but also 
because of politicians, police members and average citizens, who get more 
8  It is important to mention that the Center for Research and National Security (CISEN) 
will disappear with the arrival of the new government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador an-
nounced in September 2018. The intelligence functions of the CISEN will be assumed by the 
new Federal Secretariat of Public Security, which is led by Alfonso Durazo Montaño. The dis-
mantlement of this institution is due to its failure at reducing violence and promoting corruption 
(El Economista 2018).
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poor pay. at a social level, the development of narcotrafficking has been facili-
tated by several elements such as the pursuit of the “narco-dream” of having 
money, women, arms, power and all excess available in an easy way; a “macho 
culture”, which uses violence as a way to prove masculinity; the projection 
of narcotraffickers as heroes through the “narco-corridos”, a musical gender 
based on narrative which glorifies drug traffickers’ work and lifestyle: the so-
cial acceptance, tolerance and admiration of narcotraffickers, leading even to 
the sanctification of the “narcosanto”– narcosaint – Jesús Malverde (1870–
1909), known as a “generous bandit” or “angel of the poor”, who is considered 
a hero in the Mexican state of sinaloa (Univision 2015). 
The development of narcotrafficking has also been facilitated by the use 
of the social media, such as You tube or Facebook, by criminal groups which 
use them not only to show videos of hanging, torture and brutal killings, but 
also to advertise job vacancies for criminal activities and sell drugs through 
the “dark net”. The process of globalization has been another key factor in 
the development of narcotrafficking in Mexico, since many criminal cells and 
cartels operate on a global trade and manufacturing basis. The Mexican nar-
cotrafficking is also more complex as it is merged with other criminal activities 
such as human trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, 
racketeering, and weapons trafficking. 
The consequences of the mixture of corruption and narcotrafficking in Mex-
ico has disastrous effects, particularly for the most vulnerable groups who are the 
target of criminals. For example, in many rural villages, the narcotraffickers force 
indigenous groups to cultivate marijuana and, if the indigenous people refuse to 
do it, the traffickers kill, rape and torture the entire village. On the other hand, if 
the indigenous people accept to cultivate marijuana, when the army members ar-
rive to those villages, they kill, rape and torture them on the grounds of helping or 
being part of a cartel. In Mexico “cartels have used vast drug profits to neutralize 
government opposition, paying off judges, police, politicians, and other officials” 
(cFr 2018) to control or manipulate the application of the rule of law. 
however, Mexico is in a  key moment to implement the rule of law, par-
ticularly after the triumph of andrés Manuel López Obrador (aMLO) as the 
president-elect of the country (July 2, 2018), whose main political compromise 
during his campaign was to fight corruption. he already proposed 50 principles 
to reduce corruption and public deficit. among the most important are: 
“1. Reform Article 108 of the Constitution so that the acting president can 
be tried for electoral crimes and related to acts of corruption.
2. Suspension of all privileges for public officials.
3. Reform of the law to consider as serious crimes the influence peddling, 
corruption, the association between officials and individuals to commit 
fraud to the Treasury, fuel theft and electoral fraud in any of its modalities. 
Penalties will not allow the accused to obtain bail.
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4. The Attorney General’s Office will have absolute autonomy and its 
practices will appeal to the principle of liberal law within the frames of the 
law, nothing and nobody above the law.
 (…)
7. All officials must present the declaration of their and their close rela-
tives assets. It will be transparent in all cases.
8. The president will earn less than half of what president Enrique Peña 
Nieto receives: he will earn 40% less than the 270,000 pesos a month that 
Peña Nieto currently receives, that is, his salary will be of 108,000 pesos”. 
(Milenio 2018).
certainly, aMLO has an ambitious programme to fight corruption, impu-
nity and reduce violence in the country, which gave him a huge advantage in 
comparison to his opponents. The arrival of aMLO, with the coalition “Jun-
tos haremos historia” (together we will make history), which is composed by 
the Worker’s party (partido de los trabajadores – pt), national regeneration 
Movement (Movimiento de regeneración nacional – Morena) and social en-
counter (encuentro social), reached the highest representation in the elections 
with 53.1936%, representing 30,113,483 votes, against ricardo anaya cortés 
of the coalition for Mexico at Front (La coalición por México al frente), com-
posed by the national action party (partido de acción nacional – pan), party 
of the democratic revolution (prd) and citizen movement, which reached 
22.2750% with 12,610,120 votes. José antonio Meade Kuribreña, who repre-
sented the coalition all for Mexico (todos por México), comprised by the In-
stitutional revolutionary party (prI), Mexican ecologist Green party (partido 
Verde ecologista Mexicano – pVeM) and the new alliance party (partido 
nueva alianza – panal) achieved 16.4099%, with 9,289,853 votes (Ine, 2018). 
andrés Manuel López Obrador has also announced his strategy to reduce vio-
lence in the country through a pacification plan: “First it is to close the cycle of 
war, second, to achieve a turning point of criminal violence within 180 days, 
three, to recover the confidence of society in the security forces, projected in 
three years and, finally, deliver a country in peace and tranquillity in 2024 ” 
(Fregoso 2018). The new president has announced serious social, political and 
economic reforms, which may reduce the level of violence and corruption in 
Mexico. however, it is necessary to be aware that six years of government is 
not enough to resolve historical problems, dating from centuries ago, and put 
an end to a global problem which requires a global governmental initiative, as 
well as a strong bilateral Us-Mexico responsibility. Us should stop blaming 
only Mexico for the development of the narcotrafficking, as americans are 
also responsible not only for the high demand of the product, but also for the 
laxity of american gun laws and for protecting financial profits of Us compa-
nies, instead of well-being of people. 
232
Artículos y ensayos Bibliographic references
aguayo Quezada s. (2000), El Almanaque mexicano, México, Grijalbo
anguiano a. (1975), El Estado y la política obrera del cardenismo, México, era.
astorga L. (1999), Drug trafficking in Mexico: A First General Assessment, France, United 
nations educational scientific and cultural Organization (UnescO). 
Buendía M. (1983), La CIA en México, México, Océano.
Bureau for International narcotics and Law enforcement affairs (BInLea) (2017), 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, vol. l, U.s.a, United states department of 
state – BInLea.
cardoso G. (2016a), Saquean y endeudan sus estados, “Unomásuno”, México, november 21.
cardoso W. (2016b), Mujeres del narco, “Unomásuno”, México, december 9.
cardoso G. (2016c), Carcel por portar armas de forma ilegal, “Unomásuno”, México, 
december 16. 
carbonell M. ( 2002), El rol de las Fuerzas Armadas en la Constitución Mexicana, “Ius et 
praxis”, vol. 8, no 1, pp. 35–51. 
carpizo J. (1978), El presidencialismo mexicano, México, siglo XXI.
canales r. (2012), The deadly genius of drug cartels. conference delivered in the Usa, ted 
talks. [On line] available: http://www.ted.com/talks/rodrigo_canales_the_deadly_genius_
of_drug_cartels.html [retrieved august 17, 2018].
constitución política de los estados Unidos Mexicanos (cpeUM) (1917), constitución 
publicada en el diario Oficial de la Federación el 5 de febrero de 1917. texto vigente, 
última reforma publicada 24-02-2017 (2017). México, cámara de diputados del honorable 
congreso de la Unión secretaría de servicios parlamentarios. [On line]
http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/constitucion/1917.pdf [retrieved september 30, 2018].
council Foreign relations (cFr) (2018) Mexico’s Drug War, new York, Us, cFr. [On line: 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-drug-war] [retrieved september 30, 2018].
dale scott p. (2000), Washington and the politics of drugs, “Variant”, vol. 2, no 11, summer, pp. 2–5.
davila p. (2016), Triangulo Dorado: el crimen manda, “proceso”, May 28. 
de Llano p. (2016), Un juez envía a prisión a Humberto Moreira tras su detención en España, 
“el país”, January 16.
el economista (2018), Sí desaparecerá el Cisen: Sánchez Cordero, México, september 11.
Fernandes silva J. (2017), The Economics of Firearms, “The Market mogul”, Us, February 26. 
available [online]: https://themarketmogul.com/the-economics-of-firearms/ [retrieved 
January 20, 2018]. 
Fregoso J. (2018), López Obrador vs la violencia narco: los planes del nuevo presidente 
mexicano y la reacción de los cárteles ante un cambio inédito, Infobae, Julio 7.
[On line]
https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2018/07/07/lopez-obrador-vs-la-violencia-
narco-los-planes-del-nuevo-presidente-mexicano-y-la-reaccion-de-los-carteles-ante-un-
cambio-inedito/ [retrieved september 26, 2018]. 
233
The development 
of narcotrafficking  
and corruption in Mexico
Nubia Nieto
Forbes (2016), List of the top 10 billionaires in the world, Us, Forbes editions, July 31. 
García J. (2018), Los 3 cárteles de la droga más poderosos en México, “el diario”, new York. 
[On line] available: https://eldiariony.com/2018/04/10/los-3-carteles-de-la-droga-mas-
poderosos-en-mexico/ [retrieved august 28, 2018].
Gutiérrez-romero r. (2018), Making Bad Economies: The Poverty of Mexican Drug Cartels, 
The United Kingdom, Oxford University, oxford research group. [On line] available: 
https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Blog/making-bad-economies-the-poverty-of-
mexican-drug-cartels [retrieved august 28, 2018].
Gómora d., Muedano, M., García, d. (2016), Mexican drug cartels reinforce their fire power, 
“El Universal”, Mexico, January 24. 
Grillo I. (2013), Mexican Cartels: A Century of Defying U.S. Drug Policy, “The Brown Journal 
of World affairs”, Usa, Brown University, Winter, issue I, vol. XX, pp. 253–265.
Global currencies (2018), Historical currencies, spain, investing.com. [On line]:
https://es.investing.com/currencies/usd-mxn-converter [retrieved august 20, 2018] 
Gunson p. (2000), Arturo Durazo, “The Guardian”, august 14.
Instituto nacional electoral (Ine), (2018), Resultados electorales 2018, México, IFe. [On 
line] https://www.ine.mx/voto-y-elecciones/resultados-electorales/ [retrieved september 
20, 2018].
Krauze e. (2016), Democracia en Construcción, ensayista Liberal 6, México, debate.
Luna e. (2016), 32 mil 662 homicidios en el año, “Unomásuno”, november 27, pp. 4–5.
Meade t. a. (2010), A history of Modern Latin America. 1800 to the Present, The United 
Kingdom, John Wiley & sons ltd. 
Morris s. d. (2009), Political Corruption in Mexico. The impact of Democratization, Usa, 
Lynne rienner publishers. 
Milenio (2018), Los 50 lineamientos de AMLO para la austeridad y contra la corrupción. 
México, “Milenio diario”, julio 15, 2018. [On line] available: http://www.milenio.com/
politica/los-50-lineamientos-de-amlo-para-la-austeridad-y-contra-la-corrupcion 
[retrieved august 28, 2018].
nieto n. (2011), La socialización de las élites políticas mexicanas a través de la corrupción, 
“análisis político”, Universidad nacional de colombia, pp. 165–181. 
nieto n. (2004), La géopolitique de la corruption. Le Mexique: une étude de cas, ph.d Thesis, 
paris I, France: University of sorbonne. 
ramales Osorio M. c. (2005), El Sexenio Zedillista (1994–2000): El Agotamiento del Sistema, 
“Observatorio de la economía Latinoamericana”, no 51, november.
redmond, h. (2013), The Political economy of the Mexico’s drug war, “International socialist 
review”, issue 90, July.
redacción (2016 a), Equivale la exacción a 10% del PIB, “Unomásuno”, México, October 27. 
redacción (2016 b), Gobierna el narco Tamaulipas, “Unomásuno”, México, november 28.
rivelois J.  (1999a), Drogue, corruption et métamorphoses politiques, application à une 
comparaison Mexique-Brésil, revue tiers Monde, vol. 40, no 158, pp. 271–296.
rivelois J. (1999b), Drogue et pouvoirs: du Mexique aux paradis, paris, L’harmattan. 
234
Artículos y ensayos riding a. (1985), Vecinos Distantes. Un retrato de los mexicanos. México, Joaquín Mortiz-
planeta.
rose-ackerman s. (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, 
cambridge: cambridge University press. 
santos Villarreal G., Bustos cervantes c. (2009), Instrumentos internacionales signados por 
México en materia de narcotráfico, México, cámara de diputados LX Legislatura, servicios 
de investigación y análisis, subdirección de política exterior.
Univisión (2015), La leyenda de Jesús Malverde: Santo de los Narcos, Los angeles, Us., July 30.
